By: Rénald Fortier
Ingenium – Canada's Museums of Science and Innovation
Canada’s introduction to a deadly game of drones: An all too brief look at the Canadian career of the SAGEM Sperwer tactical unpiloted aerial vehicle, part 3
The SAGEM CU-161 Sperwer of the Canada Aviation and Space Museum after one of its uneventful landings in Afghanistan. David Pugliese, “Faulty drones risk lives: troops.” Ottawa Citizen, 29 August 2007, 10.
Welcome back, my reading friend. Are we ready to proceed on the path to enlightenment? Wunderbar! The road to a slightly better understanding of the Canadian career of the SAGEM CU-161 Sperwer tactical unpiloted aerial vehicle beckons.
As discussions concerning the long-term use of unpiloted aerial vehicles (UAV) were taking place in Canada, the Canadian Forces’ Sperwers returned to Afghanistan, possibly a tad later than originally planned, in February 2006.
In mid-March, the Canadian Forces’ Air Command, in other words the air force, was very pleased to announce that its very first UAV unit was about to become operational. Based at Kandahar, Afghanistan, that milestone / pioneering unit was attached to a squadron equipped with Canadian-made Bell CH-146 Griffon helicopters out of Canadian Forces Base Edmonton, Alberta.
Before I forget, although lower in elevation than Kabul, Kandahar was both significantly dustier and hotter than the Afghan capital in summer time. An added joy for the Canadian personnel was the large water retention pond located near the military airfield, the famous and malodorous Poo Pond.
And yes, water retention pond is a technical term for what could be described as a lake of human waste. An open air lake where the content of hundreds of portable toilets was disposed of. Bon appétit everyone. Sorry, sorry.
This time around, claiming security reasons, the Department of National Defence and / or the Canadian Forces politely refused to say how many UAVs would be used. A spokesperson indicated, however, that additional Sperwers would soon be arriving in Afghanistan. If yours truly may be a tad impertinent for a moment, it looked as if news reports detailing the problems of the Sperwer back in 2003-04 had hit a nerve. Information would be much harder to come by from then on.
By the way, did you know that at least some of the Canadian Forces people present in Afghanistan referred to the Sperwer as the “flying ski-doo”? I kid you not. The ski-doo in question was evidently the world famous Bombardier Ski-Doo snowmobile, but I digress.
What was the link between the Sperwer and a snowmobile, you ask, my puzzled reading friend? Well, you see, both of those vehicles were / are powered by a piston engine made by the Austrian firm Bombardier-Rotax Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung.
Interestingly, the Department of National Defence was looking at 2 separate sources for said additional Sperwers. One of those involved SAGEM. Well, actually, the source in question was Safran Société anonyme, a group formed in May 2005 by the merger of SAGEM and a French government firm, SNECMA Moteurs. In any event, the department ordered 5 brand spanking new Sperwers in December 2005, in preparation for a return to action in Afghanistan in 2006.
The other option under study by the Department of National Defence, the acquisition of second hand Sperwers and ground stations operated by the Hærens, or Danish army, proved equally successful. If truth be told, the Canadian Forces bought that army’s entire fleet of 10 or so Sperwers and, I think, 2 ground stations.
Acquired in 2002, the Danish Sperwers, locally known as Tårnfalks, seemed to have been plagued with malfunctions throughout their service. A crash in February 2005 was the final straw. All Tårnfalks were grounded. Permanently. Incensed Danish defence officials, including the minister, Søren Gade Jensen, stated that the Sperwer’s unreliability had also plagued other operators. Canada’s experience in Afghanistan was mentioned, as was that of a European country, the Netherlands, I think, which had tried to operate Sperwers in Iraq, another hot spot.
Following skillful negotiation by the Canadian negotiating team, possibly made in part of people from Contraves Oerlikon Incorporated, the Québec-based firm responsible for handling the Canadian Sperwer contract, the Danish negotiating team agreed to sell the Sperwers for a fraction of their price. Mind you, said Danish team might have wanted to be rid of its Sperwers as quickly as possible.
In any event, the Canadian Forces picked up those UAVs in Denmark in early September 2006, a few days after finalising the deal. Once modified to match Canadian requirements, those almost new Sperwers were seemingly used for training and / or in combat, in Canada and Afghanistan.
Before I forget, the Department of National Defence discretely ordered 10 or so additional Sperwers after, or before, December 2005. It signed that or those contracts with SAGEM or, more likely, with Safran.
In the end, the Canadian Forces received no less than 31 Sperwers. Given that, they were the world’s third largest user of Sperwers, just after the Koninklijke Landmacht, or Netherlands’ army which, as was mentioned in the 1st part of this article, operated 35 or so Sperwers, and just after the Armée de Terre, or French army, which operated more than 35, as we will soon see.
It is worth noting that many / most / all of newly acquired Sperwers were fitted with lightened wings which allowed them to carry more fuel, thus extending their range and endurance.
From mid-2006 onward, the Sperwer all but disappeared from the media’s radar screen. By August 2007, however, complaints made by a number of soldiers and officers of the Canadian Forces’ Land Force Command, in other words the army, had begun to leak out. The limited capabilities of the Sperwer were putting their safety at risk, they stated privately – and anonymously. Even though Canadian Forces officials kept on declining interviews to discuss potential problems for reasons of operational security, sources in Kandahar talked about the UAV’s serviceability issues, its limited endurance, not to mention the problems caused by the very high temperatures encountered in Afghanistan.
The Québec-based firm responsible for handling the Sperwer contract, Rheinmetall Canada Incorporated, formerly known as Contraves Oerlikon, claimed it had solutions for some of the UAV’s problems, an improved launch ramp and a more powerful engine for example. It had contacted the Department of National Defence with this information, adding that modifications would not cost all that much. Canadian officials were polite but non-committal. The Sperwer gradually disappeared from the media’s radar screen yet again.
This, however, did not mean that operations went smoothly and this even though someone from Air Command sat with colleagues from Land Force Command in each of the Sperwer ground stations. Indeed, one could argue that things got worse.
In 2006, 2 Sperwers were destroyed. In 2007, 8 Sperwers were destroyed. In 2008, 7 Sperwers were destroyed. In other words, between May 2006 and November 2008, 17 of the Canadian Forces’ 29 operational Sperwers were destroyed and at least 9 others were very seriously damaged.
As disappointing / disturbing as those losses were, one had to keep in mind the harsh environment in which the Sperwers had to operate, and the need to use them as often as possible to assist Canadian ground troops.
The Canadian public did not hear much about those losses given a decision by the Department of National Defence to the effect that statistical information concerning most Canadian Forces helicopters and UAVs flying in Afghanistan was to remain secret.
Now, who that secrecy was protecting, soldiers in Afghanistan or bureaucrats, high ranking officers and politicians in Ottawa, is a question yours truly would never dare to ask.
As you may well imagine, the Canadian Forces were quietly working on a solution to the Sperwer issue. Back in the spring of 2007, realising the usefulness of having armed UAVs to support the troops stationed in Afghanistan, Air Command apparently pushed for the acquisition of some General Atomics MQ-9 Reapers, a type of UAV capable of carrying small air to surface missiles – an outgrowth of the Joint Unmanned Surveillance Target Acquisition System project known as the Joint Airborne ISR Capability program.
And yes, the acronym ISR stood for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The absence of any reference to the attack capability of the American flying killer robot in that acronym was / is worth noting.
Operational since 2007 with the United States Air Force, the Reaper was / is a large, heavy and expensive turboprop-powered UAV controlled via satellite. It was somewhat similar in appearance to a sailplane, or praying mantis in flight, with its long and slim body and wings. Unlike the Sperwer, the Reaper had a retractable landing gear and had to be operated from some sort of prepared runway.
And yes, I know. Reaper, Predator. Someone somewhere had a knack for choosing UAV names which brought to mind Judgment Day, the fateful day when Skynet, the American super smart artificial intelligence of the Terminator movie franchise which controlled the United States’ nuclear arsenal, became self-aware, a situation which led to an attempt by freaked out American big wigs to shut down their Frankensteinian creation. A failed attempt which led Skynet to start a Third World War to rid itself of the pain in the behind carbon-based lifeforms commonly known as Homo sapiens – a scientific descriptor which means… wise man, but I digress.
And yes, there was / is a military UAV named after Arnold Alois Schwarzenegger’s character. I kid you not. From the looks of it, although unveiled in 2014, the Lockheed Martin Terminator was not put in production.
In any event, as things turned out, the Cabinet of Canada did not approve Air Command’s request to obtain some Reapers. Very much aware of the negative reactions to the relatively recent signing of large defence contracts with American firms, with little if any competition, that of the ginormous Boeing CC-177 Globemaster III cargo plane came / comes to mind for example, members of the cabinet hinted that ordering Reapers at that point, again without competition, would only add fuel to the fire and further annoy the Auditor General of Canada, the formidable Sheila Fraser. Air Command was told to go back to the drawing board.
The report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan, also known as the Manley report after its chairperson, Canadian businessman / lawyer / politician John Paul Manley, made public in January 2008, put the issue back in the spotlight. You see, said panel recommended that the Canadian Forces’ mission in Afghanistan be continued, as long as certain conditions could be met of course. One of those had to do with the acquisition, before February 2009, of high-performance UAVs which would be used for intelligence gathering, surveillance and reconnaissance.
The Canadian Forces were not caught by surprise. By the time the Manley report came out, Air Command officials had devised a new plan that would see it lease UAVs for use in Afghanistan over a 3-year period. The reaction of the aerospace industry both outside and inside Canada was mixed, to say the least.
Some firms indicated that operating leased UAVs in a combat zone was not a practical solution for a private firm. The Canadian military needed not expect bids from them. General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Incorporated, the American firm favoured by a number of Air Command officers, on the other hand, stated that it had tried not to become involved in leasing agreements but would nonetheless look at the proposal. A Canadian firm with limited experience in UAV operations, MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Limited (MDA) of Richmond, British Columbia, indicated that it would look at the proposal before making a decision.
Some aerospace industry insiders were puzzled, however. Their personal estimates of the cost of the leasing plan came close to the price the Canadian Forces would have had to pay had they simply bought the UAVs.
It has been suggested that the decision to go forward with the leasing plan was taken for political reasons, in other words for public relations reasons. Very much aware that support for the Afghan mission was very fragile indeed, the federal government did not want to be seen buying additional weapon systems.
How fragile was that support, you ask, my forgetful reading friend? Well, according to opinion polls, about 55% of Canadians disapproved more or less strongly of the country’s mission in Afghanistan.
In any event, it seemed clear that the Department of National Defence very much intended to fast track Air Command’s plan, now known as the Noctua Project, in order to have the new leased UAVs on hand by late 2008 or early 2009, thus ensuring that the Sperwer would finally be retired. The leasing plan was an interim measure which would allow the Canadian Forces to further develop the Joint Unmanned Surveillance Target Acquisition System program, regardless of the direction that might take.
All was not well, however. The planned announcement date of an order, in early July 2008, came and went without a decision. The two bids were in fact said to be unsatisfactory. Finally, in August, the Department of National Defence announced it had awarded the leasing contract to a team made up of MDA and Ha-ta’asiya ha-avirit le-Yisra’el, in other words Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), a world leader in UAV design and one located in one of the hot spots of planet Earth.
The contract would cover a two-year period, until late 2010 to be more precise, but could be extended for a third year.
IAI was to provide the UAV in question, the IAI Mahatz, which was given the Canadian military designation IAI CU-170 Heron. The total number of UAVs leased to the Canadian Forces was not made public, which made sense given that the contractor was asked to provide enough UAVs to do certain things over a certain period of time. Mind you, one could argue that keeping said number secret also allowed the Department of National Defence to keep the cost of the programme under wraps for a while.
Although quite small when compared to a supersonic jet fighter like the McDonnell Douglas CF-188, the Mahatz / Heron was / is much larger and heavier than the Sperwer. Its flight endurance was / is also much longer at 50 or so hours or more compared to 5 or so for the Sperwer. Like its predecessor, however, the Mahatz / Heron was / is powered by a piston engine made by Bombardier-Rotax.
MDA would be responsible for the management, training and maintenance aspects of the deal. Indeed, the firm’s staff would be at the controls of the Herons during every takeoff and landing in Afghanistan. That, of course, meant that MDA – not Air Command, not the Canadian Forces and not the Department of National Defence – would be on the hook if anything untoward happened during those critical phases of each flight.
The deal also imposed financial penalties on IAI or MDA (or both?) if it / they failed to provide enough UAVs during the length of the lease.
If truth be told, the conditions imposed by the Department of National Defence had caused 2 firms to withdraw from the competition, one of those being General Atomics Aeronautical Systems.
A brief digression if I may. Yours truly wonders if that deal between IAI and the Canadian forces was / is not similar at least in concept to an approach used in Western Europe (and elsewhere?). Some countries there, err, have disguised / disguise the source of the Israeli UAVs they have used and / or continue to use by changing their names and / or designations and / or ordering them, at least nominally, from a European firm.
Given how often the Tsva ha-hagana le-Yisra’el, in other words the Israeli defence forces, have used UAVs against the Palestinian civilian populations of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem, and how much the populations of those occupied territories have suffered over the past 50 years of Israeli occupation, some governments in Europe and elsewhere were / are a tad twitchy at the idea of being associated with Israeli UAV merchants.
An IAI CU-170 Heron unpiloted aerial vehicle of the Canadian Forces, possibly the first one in fact, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, March 2009. Canadian Press, Murray Brewster.
In any event, IAI delivered the first Heron in September or October 2008. By mid-January 2009, some of them were already in Afghanistan. Others stayed in Canada for training. The first operational flight in Afghanistan took place in February 2009. It has been suggested that one Heron was lost in early 2009 but the secrecy which enveloped the Canadian leasing agreement has ensured that little if any information has surfaced.
An exception to that rule came in July 2010 when a Heron crashed into power lines at Canadian Forces Base Suffield, Alberta, during a training flight. No comforter of secrecy could cover up that crash.
Incidentally, one final Sperwer had been destroyed in March 2009.
The last official flight of a Canadian Forces Sperwer took place in April 2009. Although limited in performance, that UAV had been made to work. Still, few tears were shed when a Sperwer landed in Afghanistan for the last time.
Over a period of about 45 months, in 2003-04 and 2006-09, the Sperwers had flown more than 1 300 missions in Afghanistan. All in all, 20 of the 31 UAVs acquired by the Canadian Forces were destroyed.
It is worth noting that the Canadian Forces might, I repeat might, have flown several Sperwers as late as August or September 2009, for some sort of testing work perhaps.
In any event, one question remained: what to do with the 6 Sperwers which were still airworthy. Selling some or all of them to the armed forces of other countries was an option, as was scrapping the lot of them, or retiring one or more to museums in Canada – or elsewhere.
Continued operation of that UAV in Afghanistan was simply not in the cards, regardless of what Safran representatives or defence critics of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition suggested. Indeed, Safran had indicated its willingness to take over operation of the Sperwers in Afghanistan if the Canadian Forces so desired. As you may well imagine, there was no such desire.
Indeed, according to Department of National Defence insiders, the Sperwer had in fact become an orphan of sort, a weapon without a champion. Land Force Command had Skylarks. It also had Boeing Insitu CU-169 ScanEagles, a small yet long range piston-powered American UAV, leased around 2009. Air Command, on the other hand, had Herons.
And yes, one of the ScanEagles now belongs to the stupendous and tremendous Canada Aviation and Space Museum. Mind you, that collection also includes a CF-188.
As it turned out, the 6 airworthy Sperwers were sold to France, which explained how that country apparently became the largest Sperwer user in the world.
Seven other examples of that UAV went to 7 Canadian museums. And yes, some of those Sperwers had seemingly been destroyed in crashes before being repaired or patched up for static display.
And yes, again, one of the repaired or patched up Sperwers, the very first Canadian Sperwer in fact, was added to the stupendous and tremendous collection of the Canada Aviation and Space Museum. After all, as was mentioned in the 1st part of this article, one of the reasons why yours truly toiled over a keyboard for untold seconds, a toiling which included the usual amount of angry typing (Hello, EP and EG!), was to bring to your attention the fact that the Canada Aviation Museum, as the splendid Canada Aviation and Space Museum was known until April 2010, added a Sperwer to its collection in January of that very year.
And now for a few words on the Sperwer of the Canada Aviation and Space Museum.
Seemingly used for training in Canada from September 2003 onward, that UAV arrived in Afghanistan in late October. It flew for the first time in that country in early November. The museum’s Sperwer was damaged in late 2003 or early 2004 but was back in service no later than April 2004.
The museum’s Sperwer was grounded in July, as were all UAVs of that type then operated in Afghanistan by the Canadian Forces. It was flown back to Canada in August but was used for training and / or testing at Canadian Forces Base Suffield, in September and October 2005.
Mind you, it might, I repeat might, have been involved in the training offered by people from SAGEM, at Canadian Forces Base Valcartier, Québec.
Flown back to Afghanistan in 2006, the museum’s Sperwer was damaged near Kandahar, in November of that year, when the air bags deployed for landing unexpectedly deployed shortly after launch. No longer able to stay aloft, it made a hard landing 250 or so metres (825 or so feet) from the launch site. A second accident occurred in November 2008, also at Kandahar, when a member of the launch team apparently pushed the button designed to shut down the engine, and this as the UAV was being launched. The Sperwer did not return to operation afterward.
The Sperwer arrived at the Canada Aviation Museum, today’s Canada Aviation and Space Museum, around January 2010. It went on display in late February.
The Canadian Forces ended their combat operations in Afghanistan in July 2011. The training of members of the Afghan armed forces and police continued, however. The last member of the Canadian Armed Forces, a new descriptor adopted in March 2013, stationed in Afghanistan left that battered land in March 2014.
Fighting continued more or less unabated, however, until August 2021 when the forces of the Afġānistān Islāmī Amārāt, in other words the Taliban, captured Kabul and set up a new government. The conflict which had begun almost 20 years earlier was over. The proverbial wheel had come full circle, with the return to power of the Taliban.
Tragically, a huge number of Afghans (175 000? 210 000? 245 000? 360 000?) had lost their lives along the way.
More than 1 600 000 Afghans have fled their country since the Taliban takeover, thus joining the 6 600 000 people who had fled at some point during the conflict. All in all, 1 of 5 Afghans is a refugee. In addition, two thirds of the people left in the country were in need of humanitarian and / or protection assistance.
Rénald Fortier
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